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98 CASE COMMENTS
no federal constitutional point is directly decided, strained statutory con-
structions or exceptionable interpretations of fact grounded on avoid-
ance of unconstitutionality should themselves be avoided where the
United States Supreme Court has removed the constitutional threat. For
a fundamental discussion of state taxes on gross receipts from interstate
commerce see Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by
the Taxing Powers of the States (1917-18) 31 HAnv. L. Rav. 321, 572,
721, 932, (1918-19) 32 HAv. L. Rav. 234, 374, 634, 902; Powell, New
Light on Gross Receipts Taxes (1940) 53 I-nv. L. Rav. 909; Morrison,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce (1942) 36 ILL. L. REv. 727.
E. I. E.
TAXATION-RECEIPT OF INCOME-SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT
AFTER ASSIGNMENT AS INCOME TO ASSIGNOR.--T, on the cash basis, ac
quired for $928 an interest in a syndicate prosecuting a claim against the
United States. In November 1936, judgment was rendered against the
government for $2,777,333. Briggs & Turivas v. United States, 83 Ct. Cl.
664 (1936). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in October 1937.
United States v. Briggs & Turivas, 302 U. S. 690, 58 S. Ct. 9, 82 L. ed.
533 (1937). An appropriation to pay the judgment was approved by the
President March 5, 1938. On December 31, 1937, T transferred by
deeds of gift shares of his interest in the syndicate to his minor sons,
and on January 12, 1938, like shares to his sons and his wife. The judg-
ment was paid by the government, and T's share, amounting to $34,926,
was divided by the judgment creditor among T and his transferees pro-
portional to their interests. Held, that T is liable for income tax on the
entire $34,926. Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A. 4th,
1945), affirming 3 T. C. 1092 (1944).
The tax court decided the case squarely on the ground that the
transactions between the taxpayer and his wife and s6ns were mere as-
signments of expected gains. "We can see no escape from the proposition
that the taxpayer never owned, and therefore never transferred to his
wife and sons, anything but an interest in a possible future gain to be
derived from the realization of proceeds of a judgment against the
United States for its breach of contract." Richard S. Doyle, 3 T. C. 1092,
1098 (1944). The circuit court of appeals, while approving the reason-
ing of the tax court, laying stress on the certainty of gain and absence of
any necessary activity on the part of the transferees to realize the gain, as
well as the intra-familial nature of the transactions, seemed to feel that
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. ed. 75, 131 A. L.
R. 655 (1940), Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 61 S. Ct. 759, 85
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L. ed. 1055 (1941), and Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 S. Ct.
544, 84 L. ed. 788 (1940), made a pinpoint location of income unneces-
sary to establish the taxpayer's liability.
The case brings into play a rule simple to state but puzzling to ap-
ply. In general, income, especially such as arises apart from proprietor-
ship, is taxable to him who earns or creates the right to receive it, and
assignment of the right to receive leaves the assignor still taxable. 2 MER-
TENS, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION (1942) §18.02. On the other hand,
income which fairly can be said to arise after transfer of its property
source is taxable to the transferee. Ibid. But in deciding particular cases
subsidiary rules have been generated. Where an act or forbearance of the
transferor subsequent to transfer is a requisite to receipt by the transferee,
the former is taxable. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136, 52 S. Ct. 345,
76 L. ed. 665 (1932) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241, 74 L.
ed. 731 (1930). So, too, when the transferor has earned but not received
the income, Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 61 S. Ct. 149, 85 L. ed.
81 (1940) ; and when he retains interest in or control over the flow of
income from the transferred property. MAciLL, TAXABLE INCOME
(1945) 296. Assignment of dividends or interest apart from the stock or
principal debt will not relieve the assignor of taxes. Helvering v. Horst,
311 U. S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144, 85 L. ed. 75, 131 A. L. R. 655 (1940) ;
Hyman v. Nunan, 143 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). No shift in tax
incidence occurs when the assigned income discharges an obligation of
the assignor. 2 MERT.NS, TAXABLE INCOME, at §17.22. A further class,
one that needs a great amount of limiting description, is that of enjoy-
ment of income by substitution-upon the rationale that there is no
essential difference between receipt followed by gift to a natural object of
bounty and previous assignment to the same person. Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112, 61 S. Ct. 144,85 L. ed. 75 (1940).
The Court in the principal case was loath to concede that the tax-
payer's interests in the syndicate was property; and if there was no pro-
perty in fact, there was nothing but income to transfer. However, it is
suggested that the same result might have been reached treating the
syndicate interest as property, under a rule that has emerged from an-
alogous situations: when realization of gains from dealings in property
has been changed from contingent to practically certain by a crystalliz-
ing event (in this case a judgment with possibility of appeal exhausted),
subsequent transfer does not relieve the transferor from taxes. Thus
where property is transferred after a binding sales contract has been
made, or even where the transferee sells in keeping with the transferor's
prearranged plan, profits are attributed to the latter. Mclnerney v. Corn-
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missioner, 82 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936). The same result was
reached when the owner of a building subjected to eminent domain pro-
ceedings conveyed after condemnation but before award. Louis Schoen,
30 B. T. A. 1075 (1934). But where a sales contract was no further along
than the bargaining stage, the transferor escaped income taxes. Isaac S.
Peebles, Yr., 5 T. C. 14 (1945).
Logically, transfers of stock "dividend on" should come under this
category, the declaration of the dividend being the determinative event,
but it seems unlikely that the rule that dividends are income to the holder
who receives them will be disturbed. Matchette v. Helvering, 81 F. (2d)
73 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; cert. denied, 298 U. S. 677, 56 S. Ct. 942, 80 L.
ed. 1398 (1936).
R. F.M.
TAXATION--SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS FOR LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS-
PERSONAL PROPERTY LOCALLY SITUATED NOT SUBJECT TO ASSESSiMiENT.
-Pursuant to W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 68, empowering municipalities to
construct public works, including flood control projects, to be paid for
by rents, tolls, fees, and charges other than taxation, the city of Hunting-
ton issued bonds to pay for building flood walls, with provision that the
bonds should be retired by making an assessment on all real property
benefited. In an attempt to refund the bonds the city extended the assess-
ment to personalty as well as realty. Mandamus to compel the city clerk
to countersign and attest the refunding bonds; writ denied. Held, that
a special assessment of flood control improvement may not extend to
personal property within the assessment district. State ex rel. Huntington
v. Heffley, 32 S. E. (2d) 456 (W. Va. 1944).
In Duling Bros. Co. v. Huntington, 120 W. Va. 85, 196 S. E. 552
(1935), the supreme court had announced that a local assessment would
come within the methods of paying for a flood control project, and stated
that such assessment to the property benefited would not come within the
definition of taxation. In the instant case the court, adopting the lan-
guage of Snetzer v. Gregg, 129 Ark. 542, 196 S. W. 925 (1917), said that
personalty is not to be assessed for such a project as flood control. The
reasoning was that personalty could be moved in event of flood and so
could not be benefited by local improvement. "The owner may be bene-
fited in the enjoyment of the use of his personal property in that locality,
but the property itself derives no benefit ... The situs of the personal
property follows the domicile of the owner." Id. at 546, 196 S. W. at 926.
The Arkansas decision held unconstitutional Ark. Acts 1917, No.
249, §14, in so far as it attempted to tax personal property for flood
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